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We present PrivHab, a multiagent secure georouting protocol that improves
podcast distribution on Gwanda, Zimbabwe. PrivHab learns the whereabouts
of the nodes of the network to select an itinerary for each agent carrying a piece
of data. PrivHab makes use of cryptographic techniques to make the decisions
while preserving nodes’ privacy. PrivHab uses a waypoint-based georouting
that achieves a high performance and low overhead in rugged terrain areas that
are plenty of physical obstacles. The store-carry-and-forward approach used is
based on mobile agents and is designed to operate in areas that lack network
infrastructure. The PrivHab protocol is compared with a set of well-known
delay-tolerant routing algorithms and shown to outperform them.
1. Introduction and Motivation
The last decade, many initiatives have been implemented in fields as e-health, e-government, e-education,
e-commerce and e-agriculture in order to improve the life conditions of people living in developing countries.
Universalize the access to knowledge and information is a requirement for all these applications to become
useful.
These applications are constrained by the need of infrastructure and cannot operate in regions lacking it.
Besides, e-agriculture applications, usually targeting rural areas, are very likely to deal with a lot of challenges.
A sparse population, illiteracy, a bad, non-existent or expensive telephony coverage and, especially, a lack of
data communication networks are the most common ones.
Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) (Borrego et al., 2014), based on the store-carry-and-forward strategy, is
designed to operate in challenged scenarios like the mentioned above. DTN’s operation is based on the usage
of mobile devices that opportunistically establish contact and exchange messages called bundles between
them. Due to its design, the network’s topology cannot be known beforehand in DTN because it changes
quickly. Mobile Agent based Delay Tolerant Networking (MADTN) (Martínez et al., 2013) uses mobile
agents to perform this store-carry-and-forward strategy, and it is designed to operate in scenarios where there
are no simultaneous end-to-end paths.
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radio programs. We designed PrivHab to improve the itinerary decision-making of the data-carrier agents.
PrivHab leverages the existence of life-cycles of the network users to learn about their usual whereabouts.
Then, this information is used to find an itinerary to carry the data to its destination. PrivHab treats this
information about the mobility habits of the network elements in a secure manner in order to protect node’s
privacy.
Our main contributions are summarized below:
• We present an e-agriculture application of podcast distribution, based on the real need of an NGO that
operates in Gwanda, Zimbabwe.
• We introduce the concept of node’s habitat, the area where a node is more likely to be found; and an
algorithm for making routing decisions based on this information.
• We define PrivHab, the first geographical routing protocol that uses the information about the mobility
habits of the nodes to make routing decisions.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the state of the art. In Section
3, we present an e-agriculture application of podcast distribution that can be enhanced through the usage of
PrivHab, and we discuss how to implement it using a multiagent system. In Section 4, we present the habitat,
a model of nodes’ whereabouts useful to make itinerary-selection decisions. In Section 5, we present PrivHab,
a routing protocol that use the habitats of the nodes to route messages while preserving the privacy of the
nodes of the network. In Section 6, we expose the results of the experiments made to measure PrivHab’s
performance. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. Related work
In this Section, we provide the reader with a review of the related work. We present the state of the art of
Geographical Routing Protocols. Later, we review some Social-based Routing Protocols that are related to
our proposal.
2.1 Geographical Routing Protocols
Most Geographical Routing Protocols protocols only take into account the position of the nodes at the moment
of the transmission, but not their movement pattern. GeoDTN+Nav (Cheng et al., 2010) is designed for
routing in a network of streets. It requires the nodes to know where they are heading. This requirement can
be easily met by certain types of vehicles, like buses or taxis, but it is an important drawback in scenarios
where nodes are carried by people. MoVe (LeBrun et al., 2005) is a routing protocol designed to work in
Vehicular Networks where nodes forward messages to a neighbour if the neighbour is expected to come
closer to the destination. Nodes exchange their speed vectors to make routing decisions. This short-term
predictions loose precision in when latencies are big due to a low level of connectivity. In (Li et al., 2006),
GPSR (Karp and Kung, 2000) is modified to adapt it to DTN. However, messages are routed in the basis
of a neighbourhood table. This planning approach does not adapt well to a scenarios where the topology
of the network changes quickly and in an unpredictable manner. In (Kuiper and Nadjm-Tehrani, 2011a),
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using gossip-based techniques to update the location of the destination at each hop. LoDIS improves the
performance of the routing at the cost of the privacy of all nodes, because it periodically broadcasts their
locations and speed vectors. However, between the sender and the destinations there could be barriers that
nodes carrying the data can not cross, as a river, and there could be some locations that are crucial to overcome
this obstacles, as a bridge. Therefore, data should try to follow paths that take advantage of this knowledge,
even if this imply temporarily moving away the data from its destination. This is a constraint that make usual
georouting protocols unusable (because they assume a plain world withotu obstacles).
Geographical Routing Protocols use contemporaneous information and short-term predictions, so they
fail to take into account long-term trends of nodes’ mobility. However, in scenarios where the distances to
travel are big, and the density of nodes is low, it is more valuable to know where a node will go in the next
hours than where it is currently headed.
2.2 Social-based Routing Protocols
There are some Social-based Routing Protocols that are related, somehow, to the present work. Social-based
routing protocols are based on the idea of using the recent past to model the behaviour of a node to predict
how it will behave in the near future. MobySpace (Leguay et al., 2007) leverages the life-cycles of the
nodes to track the most visited by every node points of interest. These life-cycles are modelled this using a
multi-dimensional probability vector, and messages are forwarded to nodes with a vector that it is closer to
the one of the destination. This is a very interesting approach to our concept of habitat, but lacks adaptability.
In MobySpace, the points of interest have to be defined a priori, and some infrastructure is needed to allow
nodes to detect if they are close to these points. SANE (Mei et al., 2011) uses the same principles but defines
the points of interest in a very broad sense, allowing the usage of more abstract concepts, and compares nodes
using a metric called “cosine similarity”. The frameworks presented in (Musolesi and Mascolo, 2009) (Costa
et al., 2008) go one step further and not only use the recent past to model the behaviour of a node, they use
Kalman filters to predict the future values of their attributes. However, all predictions are finally condensed in
a single value, the probability of delivery. This probability is the metric used to decide the node where every
message is forwarded.
In all proposals, nodes are expected to broadcast their information about the locations they visit or the
details about their interests to the neighbours. The authors of (Boldrini et al., 2007) recognize that privacy
is an important issue to consider in Social-based Routing Protocols, and that more work is needed to solve
it. Unfortunately, as pointed in (Karlof and Wagner, 2003), most Secure Routing Protocols aim to protect
the routing algorithm’s performance against malicious behaviours, and there are little proposals of routing
algorithms that respect or protect the privacy of the nodes of the network.
3. Application and involved Entities
In this section, we present a practical example of an e-agriculture application podcast distribution on
disconnected areas. This application could be greatly enhanced by using Mobile Agent based Delay Tolerant
Networking and PrivHab. We justify the decision of using Mobile Agents to solve a network problem. Finally,
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3.1 Application: Podcast distribution in Gwanda
In some places, due to the region’s dialect preference and the illiteracy ratios, radio broadcasting is the most
important information source for farmers. It plays a key role in the economy development of the region by
disseminating important agricultural information. This is the main way these farmers can obtain information
as valuable as what are the most appropriate crops for each season, or the most efficient processing techniques
of raw materials, among others.
In Gwanda, Zimbabwe (see Figure 1), the poor radio signal of the area leads the NGO Practical Action1
to use a manpower of 60 cooperators to bring podcasts to the villagers. The cooperators, equipped with
portable MP3 players and speakers, physically travel to the NGO office to obtain new podcasts that they play
at their assigned villages. This slow distribution method requires the NGO to spend monetary or personnel










Figure 1: Map of a scenario of application located in a rural area of Gwanda (Zimbabwe). White lines
are natural obstacles approximate limits. Podcasts sent from the village of Gwanda to the areas where the
cooperators roam have to be routed through specific locations.
Due to the challenging characteristics of the scenario, to deploy a DTN it is not enough to achieve a
fast and reliable podcast distribution. There are long distances between the senders and the receivers of the
messages, so each one has to be carried by several nodes to reach its destination. Besides, most of the nodes
near the source are likely to never meet with the nodes near the destination, making very difficult to obtain
information about how to reach them. MADTN, using Mobile Agents, brings us a set of characteristics that
PrivHab could benefit in order to deal with these challenges.
A Mobile Agent is a software entity that it is autonomous, intelligent, mobile, proactive, and represents a
third part. All of these characteristics are beneficial to PrivHab. Agents need autonomy because they have to
find their way to its destination in a changing and partially unknown environment; agents also need to be
intelligent enough to make decisions that lead them towards their goal; mobility is capital because agents
cannot control nodes’ movement, so they need to migrate when finding a more useful one; proactivity allows
agents to not only react to changes, but also to initiate context-aware actions (e.g. to start the delivery phase
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when the agent is near the destination); and representativity is the characteristic that allows applications with
different needs to use the same network in a different way, with the agents making decisions on their behalf.
For these reasons, we propose to create a Delay Tolerant Network using a set of small devices that can be
carried by the members of the NGO’s staff or by local volunteers. We also propose to automate the podcast
distribution using MADTN. The deployment’s cost of the nodes should be low2, and can be considered as an
investment, since the NGO will not need to spend more resources on the podcast distribution.
3.2 Entities of the multi-agent system
PrivHab’s goal is to build an intelligent system by improving the itinerary selection of the MADTN agents
that carry the messages. The entities involved in this multiagent system (depicted in Figure 2) are listed and
explained below.
Figure 2: Schema of the multiagent system. Dotted lines depict the main interactions between entities, while
slashed lines depict the movement of the agents. The Habitat agent updates the habitat using information
from the navigation system (e.g. a GPS receiver). The Interactor agent exchanges PrivHab’s messages with
the other nodes and informs the Carrier agent of the result of the execution. The Carrier agent carries the
message and makes the decision of migrating, staying or being cloned.
• Node: It is a location-aware mobile device (e.g. a Raspberry Pi or a smartphone), usually carried by a
person or placed in a vehicle or in a certain strategic location.
• Message: It contains the data (e.g. the podcast), it also contains the identifier of both the sender and
the receiver, and a list of waypoints that the message has to pass by in order to reach its destination.
• Habitat agent: This agent learns and updates the whereabouts of the node (more details about this
process in Section 4).
• Interactor agent: Every time a node meets a neighbour, this agent performs the PrivHab’s exchange
of messages to compare the habitats of the two nodes and decide who is the best choice to carry the
message (more details in Section 5).
• Carrier agent: This agent carries the message, and his goal is to deliver it to its destination. In order to
achieve this, the Carrier agent moves through the network and makes decisions concerning the best way
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to reach a location. The three decisions that the Carrier agent can made are: a) staying at the current
node and waiting for other neighbours; b) migrating to the neighbour; and c) being cloned, so one agent
remains at the node and the other one migrates to the neighbour.
4. The Habitat
In this section, we present the cornerstone of our georouting routing protocol: the habitat of a node. We
define the concept and show how we model it. Then, we explain the parameters involved in the calculations.
4.1 The usual whereabouts of a node
In the described scenario, each node is a small device that may be carried by the personnel of the NGO,
placed in one of their vehicles vehicle or fixed in some strategic place. Therefore, the future movements of
every node will be strongly related3 to the past movements of its carrier. A node carried by a person will
probably spend much time in the vicinity of the carrier’s home and near his workplace. A node placed in a
vehicle will often be inside a particular area. In any case, to know the places where a node has been in the
past is useful to infer if a node will visit these places again in the future (Sánchez-Carmona et al., 2015).
Figure 3: Example of a heatmap. The dark red area corresponds to the area where most time is spent, and the
lighter orange and yellow areas correspond to the regions that are rarely visited.
To have a heatmap of a node and its neighbours to decide who is the best choice would be ideal. For
example, an agent would want to migrate to a node with a heatmap like the one shown in Figure 3 if it is
carrying data destined to the west coast of Namibia, but would not if the data is destined to Mozambique.
The heatmap is an extremely accurate representation of the whereabouts of a node. However, creating and
maintaining this data is a resource consuming task that does not fit well with the small devices of the presented
network.
Therefore, we propose to use the habitat (the area where someone is more likely to be found) to model the
whereabouts of the nodes by using the simplest geometric shape: the circle. This way, nodes can automatically
calculate and store their habitat consuming the minimum computational resources by using a mobile average,
and they can use it to make routing decisions quickly.
3 The similarity of the movements patterns of a node to its future movements is above 0.8 for two days, and 0.75 for a week, and
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4.2 Definition of the habitat
We model each habitat using a circle. Each habitat H is characterized by two elements: a centre point and a
radius. From now on, we will refer as C = (x, y) to the centre point of the current habitat, and we will use R
to denote their radius. A habitat is defined by the tuple H = (C,R).
Every node’s habitat has to be updated in order to capture the trend of the node’s mobility pattern. The
update process of a habitat consists in obtaining the location of a node and adding it to his habitat’s model.
Nodes use the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) to update their previous version of the
habitat, named Hold, with a frequency of ω updates/hour. From now on, we will refer as L = (xs, ys) to the
location of a node at the moment of the update. We assume that every geographic coordinate (a pair latitude -
longitude) can be mapped4 to cartesian coordinates and that this mapping is known by all the nodes of the
network.
Step zero. Initialization of the habitat
At the initialization step, H0 is initialized with the centre point at the same coordinates of the location L0
(node’s location when the calculation starts) and R = 0.
H0 = (L0, 0) (1)
First step. Update of the centre
The first step to updating a habitat is to update the centre. The centre point of the current habitat H is
calculated by averaging using EWMA the centre point Cold and the current location L. The only parameter
involved is α (more details about α can be found in Subsection 4.2.1). This first step is depicted in Figure 4
(a).
C = L ∗ α+Cold ∗ (1− α) (2)
Second step. Update of the radius
After C has been calculated, the radius R is updated by averaging using EWMA the radius Rold of the
previous habitat and d(L,C), the distance between L and the centre point C. This second step is depicted in
Figure 4 (b).
R = d(L,C) ∗ α+Rold ∗ (1− α) (3)
As d(L,C) is the radius of a hypothetical circle with centre point C that contains L. Then, it will be
greater than Rold if L is outside the circle with centre point C and radius Rold and it will be smaller than
Rold if L is contained inside this circle. Therefore, the radius R of the current habitat will increase if L is out
of H and will decrease if L is contained by H .








c©Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND
Adrián Sánchez-Carmona et al PrivHab: a Multiagent Secure Georouting Protocol
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Evolution of the habitat: (a) The new centre point C is calculated averaging the old centre Cold
and the new location L; (b) The new radius R is calculated averaging the old radius Rold and the distance
d(L,C) that separates the new location L from the centre point C.
4.2.1 The habitat’s time span
The time span that a habitat considers is a very important parameter. For example, a node’s habitat that
considers only the last 2 hours is very likely to be a small circle around its current location. But if the habitat
considers the last 3 days, it will probably be a bigger ellipse containing both its home and workplace.
When the time span of a habitat matches the life-cycle5 of the nodes of the network, then it will become
very useful to predict the areas that the nodes will visit again in the near future.
In order to perform meaningful comparisons between habitats that consider the same time span, PrivHab
requires the nodes of the network to know it and to calculate the parameter α using Equation 4. Let ω be the
frequency of update of the habitat in updates/hour, and let T be the time span that a habitat has to consider in
hours6. During the rest of the article, we will assume that a habitat considers a time span of T hours if its




5. The PrivHab protocol
In this section, we describe the PrivHab routing algorithm. Then, we explain how the usage of homomorphic
encryption is crucial to protect nodes’ privacy. Later, we introduce the background needed to fully understand
the protocol. Following, every message that has to be exchanged during the execution of PrivHab are
presented. Finally, we provide some security considerations.
5 Usual life-cycles of people are a day or a week. People usually move very similarly to how they moved in the previous cycle.
6Using a parameter α calculated this way, due to the characteristics of EWMA, the last Tω locations added to the average tend to
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5.1 The PrivHab algorithm
We assume that the waypoints where the message has to pass to reach the destination can always be known or
guessed by the NGO local station7. They may be known beforehand or may be inferred from the knowledge
about the area.
The PrivHab routing algorithm compares two nodes and decides who is the best choice to carry the
data towards its destination. The routing algorithm chooses the nodes whose habitat’s border is closer to
the next waypoint W , prioritizing those nodes whose habitat encloses it. If a waypoint is contained inside
two different habitats, then the routing algorithm chooses the node with the smallest one, because the node
with the smallest habitat is expected to remain closer, and to be more likely to pass by the waypoint. This
algorithm is formalized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 PrivHab itinerary selection algorithm
Input:
HA, rA: Habitat of the node A carrying the message and its radius.
HB , rB : Habitat of the candidate node B and its radius.
P : Location where the message has to be carried to.
Output:
A or B: The best choice to carry the message towards P .
1: if P ∈ HB and P /∈ HA then
2: return B # P is inside habitat of B and outside habitat of A: select B
3: else if P ∈ HB and P ∈ HA and rA ≥ rB then
4: return B # P is inside both habitats: select the smallest habitat
5: else if d(P ,HA) > d(P ,HB) then
6: return B # P is outside both habitats: select the nearest habitat to P
7: else
8: return A # If B is not a better choice: by default select A
9: end if
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: Three possible situations in habitat-based routing: (a) The next waypoint is located outside the two
habitats; (b) Only one of the habitats encloses the location of the next waypoint; (c) The two habitats enclose
the location of the next waypoint.
7 Note that it is much easier to know the approximate physical path that the message has to travel to reach its destination, than to
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Figure 5 show the different situations that can be faced. In (a) and (b) node A is chosen as the best option,
because the waypoint W is closer to HA or inside it. In (c) the best choice is B, because both habitats contain
W , but HB is smaller than HA.
5.2 Nodes’ privacy protection: homomorphic encryption
As said in (Hsu et al., 2008), privacy is an important issue in a routing protocol that learns information about
the users. In PrivHab, the habitat is used during the routing to decide the best node to carry the data towards
its destination. For this reason, PrivHab needs to be secure and do not reveal the habitat information to any
other part. On the other hand, waypoints are routing information that has to be known by the routers that take
custody of the data. Moreover, although they are not a private information, they must remain hidden.
For this reason, PrivHab uses the Paillier (Zhong et al., 2007) additive homomorphic cryptography to
protect nodes’ privacy by comparing the habitats while cryptographically protected and avoiding revealing
this private information to any other part. An additive homomorphic cryptosystem is one in which, given two
encrypted operands E(a) and E(b), E(a+ b) can be computed without separately decrypting each one.
In a communication between Alice and Bob, Alice selects two random primes p and q and computes
n = pq; plaintext messages are elements of Zn; however, ciphertext messages are elements of Zn2 . Then
Alice picks a random g ∈ Z∗
n2 such that gcd((L(g
λ mod n2)),n) = 1, where λ = lcm(p− 1, q− 1) and
L(x) = (x− 1)/n. Alice’s public key is PkA : (n, g) and her private key is pkA : (λ, p, q).
To encrypt a message m, Bob picks a random r ∈ Z∗n and computes c = E(m) = gm · rn mod n2,
the ciphertext of m. Then, Bob can easily compute E(a + b) = E(a) · E(b) mod n2 = ga+b · (r1 ·
r2)n mod n2), E(a− b) = E(a)/E(b) mod n2 = ga−b · (r1/r2)n mod n2), and E(a · s) = E(a)s
mod n2 = ga·s · (rs1)n mod n2). Finally, to obtain the messagem, Alice computesD(c) = L(cλ mod n2) =
m.
However, the operations that can be performed in the Paillier cryptosystem are restricted: only addition,
subtraction and multiplication by a clear operand are allowed.
5.3 Background: distance comparison
The distance between a point P : (xP , yP ) and a habitat H with centre C : (xC , yC) and radius R is
d(H,P ) =
√
(xC − xP )2 + (yC − yP )2 −R. Equivalently, we can compute X : (a, b), the nearest point
of H to P , with a = xC −R · cosβ and b = yC −R · sin β being β = tan−1( yC−yPxC−xP ) the angle between
the x axle and the segment joining P and C.
Finally, we calculate d(H,P ) = d(X,P ) =
√
(a− xP )2 + (b− yP )2. As d(X,P )2 = (a− xP )2 +
(b− yP )2 can be computed without computing any square root, PrivHab benefits from this to compare the
square of the distances from habitatsHA andHB to P by checking the sign of d = d(XA,P )2− d(XB ,P )2.
The schema of this calculation is depicted in Figure 6.
5.4 Background: point inclusion
A point P : (xP , yP ) is contained inside a circular habitat with centre C : (xC , yC) and radius R if and only
if
√
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Figure 6: In slashed blue lines, the calculations needed to obtain β. In dotted green lines, distance d(X,P )
is calculated before calculating the location of X : (a, b).
(yC − yP )2). P is contained inside the circle if and only if d > 0.
Figure 7: In slashed blue lines, P is located inside the habitat because R is bigger than d(C,P ). In dotted
red lines, P is located outside the habitat because R is smaller than d(C,P ).
This way PrivHab can know if a waypoint is contained inside the habitat using only operations allowed
by the Paillier cryptosystem8. The schema of this calculation is depicted in Figure 7.
5.5 PrivHab’s exchange of messages
Let A be the node that carries a set of messages mi, with a habitat HA : (CA,RA). Let Wi : (xWi , yWi) be
the next waypoint where each message mi wants to be carried to, and let B be a neighbour with a habitat
HB : (CB ,RB). We denote EY (m) as the Paillier additive homomorphic encryption of m using Y ’s public
key. We denote a message sent by A to B with A→ B : message. By the previous definitions, A want to
know if B is a better choice to carry each message mi towards Wi.
The protocol consists of five steps. The first and the second prepare A and B to participate in the protocol,
these actions can be done asynchronously. The third lets B obtain the information he needs to calculate the
distance from W [i] to the habitat HB . The fourth performs the comparison between the habitats. And the
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last step uses the information previously exchanged between the nodes to let A determine if B is a better
choice and the message has to be forwarded.
1. Node A calculates dAi = d(HA,Wi)2, the square of the distance between its habitat and every Wi
(dAi = 0 if Wi ∈ HA and dA ≥ 1 otherwise). A knows both HA and Wi, so the calculation of dAi
can be performed without using homomorphic encryption.
2. Node B announces9 to A the centre CB : (xCB , yCB ) of its habitat.
B → A: EB(xCB ),EB(yCB )
3. Node A subtracts the coordinates of every Wi to the coordinates of CB . Then, A multiplies both results
by the same nonce (a random one-use value) using Equations 5 and 6.
(EB(xCB )/EB(xWi))
nonce = EB((xCB − xWi) · nonce) (5)
(EB(yCB )/EB(yWi))
nonce = EB((yCB − yWi) · nonce) (6)
Following, A sends to B the results10 and the coordinates of Wi, the distances dAi, the radius RA, and
the information B needs to calculate dBi = d(HB ,Wi)2.
A→ B:
{EB((xCB − xWi) · nonce),EA(dAi),EA(x2Wi),EA(2yWi),EA(2xWi),
EB((yCB − yWi) · nonce),EA(y2Wi),EA(xWi),EA(yWi)}
i,EA(RA)
4. B decrypts the received subtractions and, for each Wi, computes βi using Equation 7.
βi = tan−1(((yCB − yWi) · nonce)/((xCB − xWi) · nonce)) (7)
NodeB uses βi to calculate is the nearest point ofHB toWi, calledXi : (ai = xCB −RB · cosβ, bi =
yCB −RB · sin β). Then, B calculates d(HB ,Wi)2 = dBi, the square of the distance between Wi







2 − 2axWi − x
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2 + (b− yWi)
2) = EA(dBi) (8)
Following, B calculates the point inclusion of each Wi in HB using Equation 9, the comparison of
distances using Equation 10, and the comparison of radius using Equation 11. This time, three different
9 This announcement can be made by adding this information to the messages exchanged during the neighbour discovery process.
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nonce values are used to randomize the results. The dAi factor is used to blur11 the point inclusion test
and the comparison of radius.
(EA(R
2
B) ·EA(dAi))/(EA(dBi))nonce = EA((R2B + dAi − dBi) · nonce) (9)
(EA(dAi))/(EA(dBi))nonce = EA((dAi − dBi) · nonce) (10)
(EA(RA) ·EA(dAi)RBi)/(EA(RBi))nonce = EA((RA + dAi ·RB −RB) · nonce) (11)
Finally, for each Wi, B orders the results of the two comparisons and the point inclusion test in a
random way and sends it to A.
B → A:
{Random_order(EA((RA + dAi ·RB −RB) · nonce),EA((dAi − dBi) · nonce),
EA((R
2
B + dAi − dBi) · nonce))}i
5. Node A decrypts the three received values to learn the result of PrivHab’s execution. B is considered a
better choice to carry mi towards Wi if the three decrypted values are equal or greater12 than 0.
5.6 Security considerations
A secure multi-party computation (Goldreich, 1998) consists in computing a function on any input, on a
network where different participants hold each input. A protocol is considered secure if it ensures that no
more information is revealed to a participant than what can be inferred from that participant’s input and the
computed output. PrivHab has been designed to reveal only the result of the comparison and the inferences
that can be deduced from this output. The next paragraphs consider a passive adversary situation, where one
participant executes the protocol and then makes inferences to obtain knowledge about the other participant’s
inputs.
On one hand, node A only knows if HB is better or worse than HA. Then, A can can use this knowledge
to infer about the relation between dA and dB , the relation between RA and RB , or to deduce if Wi ∈ HB .
The information that A can learn and infer is presented in Table 1.
On the other hand, node B cannot even know the result of the execution, because it is computed while
encrypted. Note that A uses the result of the execution of PrivHab to decide if a message mi has to be
forwarded to B or not, but A may use too any other information to make this decision, so receiving or mi is
not enough for B to infer the result of the comparison. For this reason, B cannot infer anything about HA.
Besides, maintaining Wi hidden to B when the data is not forwarded is crucial to avoid that B can calculate
dB and use it to infer information about HA. The only information that is revealed to B during the execution
of the protocol is β. Note that the angle β is a less accurate information than the coordinates of Wi or the
distance between Wi and HB . Moreover, B does not even know who is the destination if he does not receives
the message, and the protocol will not be executed again between the same participants. Therefore, B can not
11 If dAi > dBi, then the best choice is B, and the result of the point inclusion test and the comparison of radius are not needed.
12 PrivHab checks several times if an operand ρ is negative. As ρ is an element of Zn, to check this condition, we ensure that n is








c©Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND
Adrián Sánchez-Carmona et al PrivHab: a Multiagent Secure Georouting Protocol
A knows A infers
Input Output dA ↔ dB P ↔ HB rA ↔ rB
P ∈ HA
B dA = dB = 0 P ∈ HB rA ≥ rB
A dA ≤ dB P /∈ HB or rA < rB
P /∈ HA
B dA ≥ dB Nothing Nothing
A dA < dB P /∈ HB Nothing
Table 1: Knowledge obtained by A. If B a better choice, then A infers that HB is closer to location P than
HA. Node A also infers that HB is smaller than HA if P is contained inside HA. When B is a worse choice,
then A infers dB is larger than dA, but cannot know if HB is bigger or smaller than HA.
relate Wi with any node neither use β to triangulate its location. The information that B can learn and infer is
presented in Table 2.
B knows B learns B infers
Output About P About dB dA ↔ dB
Message




Table 2: Knowledge obtained by B at the end of the protocol. Node B cannot infer if it is a better candidate
than A. B receives the coordinates of P with the message. If the message is not sent, B only learns β.
Finally, an active attacker can try to learn things about the other part’s habitat by producing chosen-
destination arbitrary messages and repeatedly executing PrivHab. As A is the node that starts the transaction
and the only one that knows the number of messages he carries, he can determine how many times to execute
PrivHab. An attackerA can try to uncover the area covered byHB by executing PrivHab repeatedly, benefiting
from the fact that there is no way for a node B to tell apart a truthful execution of PrivHab from an untruthful
one because nodes always operate with encrypted data. However, B can decrease the effectiveness of these
attacks by limiting the amount of interactions per unit of time with every other node and forcing A to send
him at once the information needed to perform all the executions before sending any response. Depending on
the configuration of the network, slowing enough an attack is equivalent to avoiding it, because when time
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6. Experiments and Results
In this section, we study the computational and communication overhead introduced by PrivHab. Then, we
explain how we have modelled the scenario we have chosen to evaluate PrivHab. Finally, we provide the
obtained results.
6.1 Implementation measurements
As a proof-of-concept we have developed and deployed an implementation of the presented protocol on three
Raspberry Pi boards as the one depicted in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Raspberry Pi Broadcom BCM2835 SoC full HD, 700MHz Low Power ARM1176JZ-F, 512MB
SDRAM, 256MB SD with Raspbian, Wi-Pi Wireless Adapter (802.11n up to 150Mbps), GPS receiver NL-302U
(baud rate: 4800 bauds) and a dual output 5000mAh battery.
We have used our proof-of-concept implementation, using Paillier’s length keys of 512, 1024 and 2048
bits, to forward 600 podcasts of sizes between 10MB and 20MB13. We have repeated the tests five times.
We have measured the average time needed to make the calculations and to exchange all the messages. The
obtained results have been incorporated to the simulations.
Key length Time (ms) Overhead 10MB (%) Overhead 20MB (%)
512 bits 574.2± 0.7 3.48 1.77
1024 bits 3, 977.0± 31.7 24.07 12.28
2048 bits 25, 031.5± 69.8 151.49 77.29
Table 3: Average execution time of PrivHab using different key lengths. The overhead is the extra amount of
time needed to send 10MB or 20MB.
As can be seen in Table 3, PrivHab execution time depends heavily on the key length used. When using
keys of 512 bits, PrivHab can be executed by a low-end device in half a second. Meaning an overhead of less
than 4% when sending messages larger than 10MB. The execution time increases to 3.9 seconds when using
13 This is the size of an audio file with ID3 version 2.4.0, extended header, containing: MPEG ADTS, layer III, v1, 128 kbps, 44.1
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keys of 1024 bits14. Given the average length of connectivity windows in remote village scenarios presented
in (Grasic and Lindgren, 2014), this overhead is acceptable. When using keys of 2048 bits, the execution
time is high.
6.2 Modelling
We have modelled the scenario presented in Section 3. In our model, 60 cooperator nodes implement a
mobility pattern that takes into account home’s and work’s locations and a daily life-cicle. Agents carrying
podcasts of 15-20MB are injected in the network by the NGO office, located in the village of Gwanda. Every
podcast is sent to one cooperator chosen randomly. We assume that the NGO office knows the area assigned
to each cooperator and the necessary waypoints to reach each one. After executing PrivHab, the Carrier
agents always migrate to nodes that are considered better choices. We have modelled the overhead introduced
by PrivHab considering that the Interactor agents needs 3.9s to perform the exchange of messages.
Figure 9: Snapshot of one of the simulation using The ONE. Nodes are depicted using a green circle with
a blue label, habitats are depicted with red circles. The background map of Gwanda has been disabled to
improve the visibility of the figure.
In order to obtain conclusive results, we have compared the performance of PrivHab with a bench-mark of
well-known routing protocols used in (Musolesi and Mascolo, 2009): Prophet, Binary Spray & Wait (L=40),
Epidemic and Random. We have added two routing protocols to this set: MaxProp and First Contact. All
simulations have been performed using The Opportunistic Network Simulator (The ONE, Figure 9) (Keränen
et al., 2009), and have been repeated twenty times using different random seeds.
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Figure 10: Results of the simulations. Latency and delivery ratio.
6.3 Simulation results
The performance of all the compared protocols is presented in Figure 10, that shows the latency and delivery
ratio, and in Table 4, that shows the average number of aborted relays and dropped podcasts, and the network
overhead, calculated as the relation between the number of the relays done and the number of delivered
podcasts.
Single-copy protocols, as Random and First Contact, do not fill up the buffers. Therefore, they obtain
medium delivery ratios because nodes are not forced to drop podcasts. However, their decision making is
poor, podcasts are usually forwarded to nodes that could not bring the podcasts closer to their destination,
so podcasts last longer on the network. For this reason, their latency is high and they produce an enormous
amount of aborted relays. Flooding-based protocols, as Epidemic and Prophet, generate en enormous network
overhead that fill the buffers early. Therefore, they obtain medium latencies but low delivery ratios because
almost all nodes effort while forwarding podcasts is wasted, usually because the podcasts are dropped before
approaching their destination. BS&W and MaxProp perform well in terms of latency. But their performance
in terms of delivery ratio is totally opposed. Binary Spray & Wait, performs poor in terms of delivery ratio
because of his epidemic-style spread, while MaxProp obtains a high delivery ratio because his dropping
policy based on probabilities of delivery manages to drop less messages. PrivHab takes the best decisions
because it is the only protocol that takes into account both the pathway to the destination and the mobility
patterns of the neighbours, and manages to spread the podcasts towards their destination. For this reason,
PrivHab obtains the lowest network overhead and latency latency of the single-copy protocols.
PrivHab delivers more data to its destination. Besides, it does it faster than all other protocols except
BS&W and MaxProp, and it consumes fewer network resources to do so. We can state that PrivHab is the
protocol that suits better to any scenario with characteristics like the presented one.
7. Conclusions
The habitat models node’s whereabouts based on the idea of the time span. It is useful to decide what node is
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Protocol Dropped podcasts Overhead Aborted relays
Epidemic 197, 030 964.66% 114, 380
Prophet 130, 647 855.96% 382, 557
Maxprop 9, 929 65.91% 252, 023
BS&W-40 33, 373 36.66% 114, 380
Random 396 112.40% 375, 200
First Contact 75 46.73% 217, 280
PrivHab+ 128 9.68% 51, 343
Table 4: Obtained results in terms of network overhead and number of dropped podcasts. Network overhead
is calculated as the relation between the number of the relays done and the number of delivered podcasts
multiagent system for itinerary-selection based on MADTN that uses the habitats to make routing decisions.
PrivHab also makes use of homomorphic cryptography techniques to preserve nodes’ privacy.
We have presented a podcast distribution application in Gwanda, based on the real work of the NGO
Practical Action. PrivHab’s characteristics make him ideal to operate in scenarios where nodes mobility
patterns are complex, but non-random, where lots of hops are needed to reach the destination of the messages
from their source because of the long distances, and where nodes are so related, directly or indirectly, to a
person that their privacy needs to be protected.
As future lines of research, we plan to improve the circular model of habitat, to study the best strategies
when using PrivHab, to make PrivHab compatible with the usage of pseudonym generator mechanisms and to
enhance PrivHab to compare simultaneously three or more habitats. We also plan to study the performance of
PrivHab in different scenarios based on real applications.
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